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In Book III of his Treatise of Human Nature, David Hume considers the following
simple interaction:
I suppose a person to have lent me a sum of money, on condition that it be
restor’d in a few days; and also suppose, that after the expiration of the term
agreed on, he demands the sum
and Hume asks:
What reason or motive have I to restore the money? [1740, p.479]
The answer, according to Hume, could be the borrower’s “abhorrence of villainy and
knavery”, but this could only be the case in “a civiliz’d state, when [the borrower] is
train’d up according to a certain discipline and education”. This cannot be the answer,
however, when the interaction is looked at from the perspective of man’s basic “rude
and more natural condition”. Nor can the answer be found in “a concern for [the
borrower’s] private interest or reputation” (repeated game considerations) or in “a
regard to the interest of the [lender]” (altruism). The analysis of certain specific
scenarios (supposing, for example, “that the loan was secret” or that the lender “be a
vicious man”) enables Hume to show that these answers, too, cannot be right. The
answer, he therefore concludes, must be “that the sense of justice and injustice [which
is the motive for repaying the loan] is not deriv’d from nature, but arises artificially,
tho’ necessarily, from education and human conventions” (p. 483).
                                                
* I wish to express my sincere thanks to the Centre for Economic Learning and Social Evolution,
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hospitality.2
It is important to appreciate the meaning of the terms “natural” and “artificial”, as
used by Hume. The former refers to traits and norms that correspond to man’s
primary motives (such as “self-love, when it acts at its liberty”) whereas the latter
refers to traits and norms that apply to “man in his civiliz’d state”. Thus, the term
“natural” describes the modes of behavior and interaction that characterize Hobbes’s
“State of Nature”, whereas “artificial” describes the modes of behavior and interaction
that characterize a “civilized” society. The transition from the State of Nature to a
civilized society is thought of as an evolutionary process whereby, mainly through
education, certain conventions take hold and thrive. Hume’s perspective is clearly
evolutionary in essence, with the term “artificial” (which, Hume emphasizes, is not to
be understood in the sense of “arbitrary” or “contrived”) being used to describe a kind
of mutation-driven drift from the State of Nature to higher forms of interaction. The
agents through which the emerging modes of behavior are passed on from generation
to generation (Dawkins’s “memes” ?) are the conventions. Repaying one’s loans,
even when issues such a retribution and long-term reputation do not arise, is an
example of such a convention, and Hume obviously thinks, moreover, that it is a
convention capable of long-term persistence.
It is my purpose in this essay to offer formal (and modern) underpinnings for Hume’s
argument. I shall do so in the context of Hume’s own example, cited above, where the
interaction being considered is one between lender and borrower.
There have been several attempts, in the literature, to provide a modern version of
David Hume’s conventions, notably those of David Lewis [1967] and Peyton Young
[1993]. The focus in these studies was an aspect of David Hume’s conventions which
is different from the one to be explored herein. Specifically, Hume sees conventions
also as instruments of coordination, with language being the most important case in
point. Coordination, notably coordination towards one specific equilibrium among the
possibly many that exist, is the feature of most recent studies of conventions. Here,
conventions will be studied in their role as vehicles for supporting seemingly non-
self-seeking behavior, such as repaying one’s loans when self-interest would indicate
otherwise.3
2. A Simple Credit Market
Let us think of a credit market where n potential borrowers face one lender.  The case
of a single borrower (n = 1) will be as in David Hume’s above cited vignette, namely:
BOR LEN BOR
That is,
  -  The borrower must decide, first of all, whether or not to seek a loan from the
lender.
  -  Seeking the loan is in itself costly, requiring the payment of an “application
fee” e  (e > 0).
  -  The loan application can either be approved or be rejected by the lender.
  -  The rate of interest being charged, on a standard loan of size 1, is r.
  -  The value of the loan to the borrower is denoted v.  It is assumed that v > r+e,
i.e., obtaining the loan is worthwhile.
  -  If the loan application is approved, the borrower can either  repay (with
interest) or renege (default).
In extending this basic interaction to the case of n potential borrowers, we shall keep
matters simple by assuming that –
-  The decision regarding whether or not to seek a loan is made by each potential
borrower independently of the decisions of the others.
-  All loans are identical, both with regard to size (normalized at 1) and with
regard to the rate of interest being charged, r.
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-  The value v of a loan is common to all potential borrowers.
-  The lender’s action comes after  all the borrowers have made their initial
moves, i.e., after all applications for loans have been filed.
- The players (lender and potential borrowers alike)  do not randomize their
moves.
And finally, an assumption is made that explicitly rules out all long-term or repeated
game considerations, such as the borrowers’ reputations:
- After the interaction, all the borrowers vanish into the crowd, never to be
recognized again.
Clearly, regardless of the precise timing of actions, or of the exact definitions of
players’ strategies (these will be specified shortly) we are going to have the inactive
market as this system’s unique equilibrium point. In other words, the only way for
the interaction, as described, to resolve itself coherently is for all borrowers to play
“out” in the first move (i.e. to refrain from applying for credit) and for the lender to
play “deny all”, i.e., to reject all credit applications received, no matter how many (if
any) had been filed.
Thomas Hobbes would presumably argue at this point that the rational thing for
borrowers to do would be to relinquish their choices and place them in the hands of
the Sovereign.
3. Enter David Hume
Now suppose that a convention, under which the repaying of loans is thought to be
one’s duty, somehow gains a foothold among potential borrowers. (We could speak,
figuratively, of a loan-repaying mutant coming into being.) Thus, there are now two
types of borrowers in existence, namely loan repayers (to be known as borrowers of
Type A) and maximizers (Type B). We shall assume the borrower’s type (A or B) to
be private information, so that there does not exist an outwardly observable signal
that is in any way informative regarding a given borrower’s type.5
As before, let there be n potential borrowers and suppose that, among them, k are type
A’s (0 £ k £ n) while n-k are Type B’s. There is one lender (“The Credit Agency”) to
whom all potential borrowers must turn when applying for a loan. Let the Credit
Agency be denoted C, for short. The lender-borrower game of section 2 now exists in
two different versions, depending on the borrower’s type. Specifically, when the
borrower is of Type A, we have:
A C
and when the borrower is of Type B:
B C
reflecting the fact that A’s always repay their loans, while B’s never do. (Recall that
at the end of the interaction all borrowers vanish into the crowd, never to be
personally recognized again.)
We may now consider the following (n+1)–player game:
  -  There are k players of Type A, each with strategy set {0, 1}.
  -  There are n-k players of Type B, each with strategy set {0, 1}.
  -  The strategy set of the (n+1)st player (“Player C”) is {0, 1, …, n}.
The interpretation of the players’ strategies is as follows: For any borrower, playing
“1” means “apply for a loan”, while “0” means “stay out”. For player C, playing some













does not exceed c, and deny all pending loan applications otherwise”. This definition
of Player C’s strategies is a spelling out of the following assertions: (1) The Credit
Agency moves only after all borrowers had made their moves (i.e., after all loan
applications have been filed). (2) The Credit Agency cannot distinguish among
pending loan applications, so all it can act on is their number.
The parameters n and k are assumed to be common knowledge among the players.
Before writing down the players’ payoff functions, let us observe that, due to the
anonymity of borrowers, any profile of strategies can be fully represented by a triple
of integers of the form (a, b, c) where:
a  is the number of Type A’s playing “1”.
b  is the number of Type B’s playing “1”.
c  is C’s strategy (i.e., C’s choice from {0, 1, …, n}).
Given any triple of integers (a, b, c) satisfying 0 £ a £ k,  0 £ b £ n-k,  0 £ c £ n, let
Yi
A(a, b, c) be player i’s payoff under (a, b, c) if  i is a borrower of Type A, and
similarly  Yi
B(a, b, c) for the case where player i  is a borrower of Type B, with
Y
C(a,b,c)  being the payoff for player C. Then,
  (v-r-e)si       if  a+b £ c
Yi
A(a, b, c) =
                                                   -esi                    if   a+b > c
  (v+1-e)si    if  a+b £ c
Yi
B(a, b, c) =
   -esi                    if   a+b > c
        ar-b            if  a+b £ c
Y
C(a, b, c) =
       0                 if   a+b > c
where si is the strategy (0 or 1) actually played by player i.
We now have a well-defined game in strategic form, to be referred to in the sequel as
the credit game.7
4. Equilibrium in the Credit Market
Let a, b and c be integers satisfying  0 £ a £ k,  0 £ b £ n-k,  0 £ c £ n.  We shall say
that (a, b, c) is an equilibrium of the credit market if there exists a Nash equilibrium
of the credit game where the number of A’s playing “1” is a, the number of B’s
playing “1” is b, and player C’s chosen strategy is c. An equilibrium  (a, b, c) of the
credit market is said to be active if c > 0. Finally, an active equilibrium (a, b, c) of the
credit market is said to be maximally active, if there does not exist an equilibrium
(a¢, b¢, c¢) with c¢ > c.
To illustrate these concepts, let us consider the simplest non-trivial example, namely
the case n = 2, k = 1. Let us assume also that r < 1. The credit game in this case has 3
players, namely 2 borrowers – an A and a B – plus the Credit Agency C. The game
can be written out as follows, with A picking a row, B picking a column and C
picking a matrix:











































The game obviously has 2 equilibria in pure strategies, namely (0, 0, 0) and (1, 0, 1).
Of these, the first is inactive and the second is active. Indeed, (1, 0, 1) is also
maximally active, since there does not exist an equilibrium with c = 2 (since  r < 1 ).









Proposition: Let a, b and c be integers satisfying 0 £ a £ k, 0 £ b £ n-k, 0 £ c £ n.
Then (a, b, c) is an equilibrium of the credit market if, and only if, the following two
conditions hold:
(i)  a + b = c
(ii)  ar – b ‡ 0
Proof: Condition (i) holds if, and only if, none of the borrowers (players 1, 2, …, n)
has a unilateral switch of strategy that would be payoff-improving. Condition (ii) is
the same statement for the Credit Agency (player C). ￿
The following remarks follow readily from this Proposition:
(1)The inactive market (a = b = c = 0) is always an equilibrium; (2) in any active
equilibrium, we must have a > 0 , i.e., the market cannot be active without the






holds, so it is in everybody’s interest that the number of Type A players actively
participating (i.e., playing “1”) be large;  (4) the number of Type A borrowers that
must be active in order to support an active borrower of Type B in equilibrium
increases as the rate of interest declines.
The foregoing Proposition tells us also that, when r > 0 and k > 0, there always exists
an active equilibrium and, a-fortiori, there also exists a maximally active equilibrium.
Indeed, the maximally active equilibrium is easily characterized, as follows:
For any real number x, let [x] be the greatest integer that does not exceed x. Define  b ˆ
by writing:
[ ] ( ) rk k n b , min ˆ - =10
Assume that  k > 0. Then, the triple (k, b ˆ, k+b ˆ) is an equilibrium of the credit market
which, moreover, is maximally active. This characterization is an immediate
consequence of the Proposition.
Let Y ˆ A, Y ˆ B and Y ˆ C  be the average (per player) payoffs of, respectively, a borrower






















We note, finally, that if [rk] < n-k, the equilibrium of the credit market – even when it
is maximally active – involves credit rationing, in the sense that some potential
borrowers who would love to borrow at terms being offered in the market are being
barred in equilibrium from carrying out their wish.
5. Evolutionary Dynamics
Imagine now that loan-repaying borrowers (Type A) are pitted against relentless
maximizers (Type B) in an evolutionary struggle. Folklore tells us that the Type A’s
can never prevail. ( Proof: B’s can always choose to mimic whatever the A’s are
doing, so their reproductive success must always be at least as high as that of A’s.
Moreover, if the B’s – being maximizers – ever choose to deviate from mimicking the
A’s, the result must be such as to give them reproductive advantage.) This folk tale,
pretty though it is, happens also to be false, as will now be shown.
Let us return to the credit market of sections 3 and 4, with one Credit Agency serving
n potential borrowers, k of whom A’s and n-k  B’s. Let the proportion of A’s in the
borrower population be denoted p  (p = k/n)  and suppose that the evolution of p over
time is governed by the relative overall performance of the two types of borrowers.
More precisely, we are now allowing the credit market to operate repeatedly with the
values of n and k, and even the identities of the players, possibly changing along the11
process. In each period, the credit game of section 4 is played out and, after players
receive their payoffs, all the borrowers vanish into the crowd and nobody can be
recognized when the market re-convenes in the next period. Indeed, next period’s
players need not even be the same individuals. (This assumption is made, it will be
recalled, in order to rule out repeated game considerations, such as reputation effects.)
We are now ready to describe the manner in which evolutionary pressures affect the
progress over time of the population parameter p. Specifically, let us assume that







NEXT stands for the value of p in the next period, and 
A Y ˆ , 
B Y ˆ  are the per-player
payoffs earned in this period by borrowers of Type A and B, respectively. Thus, all
that is being asserted is that the direction of change in p is such as to reflect the
relative success (as measured by average payoff) of the two types. This is a simple
instance of the evolutionary rule known as “replicator dynamics”.
A rest point of the evolutionary process is a value p* 
 such that at p =  * p  we have
p
NEXT = p.  A long–term equilibrium is defined as a dynamically stable rest point.
Assume, finally, that the credit market proceeds along a path of maximally active
within-period equilibria. We could perhaps think of some institution (the Fed?) seeing
to it that, in every period, the financial market is as active as it can be, consistent with
equilibrium.
Recall that b ˆ = min(n-k, [rk])  is the number of Type B borrowers who obtain loans in
a maximally active equilibrium. Clearly, if  b ˆ = n-k, i.e., if all potential borrowers of
Type B become active in the market, then the corresponding value of p cannot be a
rest point (when all the B’s are in, the average, per player, payoff of a B exceeds that

















To locate a rest point, a value of  p must be found for which 
A Y ˆ =
B Y ˆ . Using the
approximation [rk] » rk, we find 












which, in turn, yields a unique value for  p, call it  * p , for which 
A Y ˆ  = 
B Y ˆ .













From the fact that the odds p/(1-p) are increasing in p, it follows immediately that, for
values of p satisfying p „ p
*, we have  ( )( ) 0 ˆ ˆ * > - -
B A Y Y p p .  Hence, p * is in fact a
(unique) long-term equilibrium. Note that, strictly speaking, p = 0 and p = 1 are also
rest points of the dynamics, even though Y
A is not well defined at p = 0 (there being
no A’s) and Y
B is not well defined at p = 1 (there being no B’s). However, both these
rest points are unstable, so p
* is indeed the unique long-term equilibrium.
The fact that v > r+e, i.e., that the value of a loan exceeds its cost, ensures that p
* > 0.
In other words, the long-term survival of loan repaying borrowers (Type A’s) is
guaranteed. It should be noted also that p
*ﬁ
 1 as r ﬁ 0, reflecting the fact that when
the rate of interest is lower, more loan repayers are needed, in equilibrium, to uphold
the market.
Finally, looking at the definition of p
*, we see that the inequality p
* < 1/(1+r) always
holds. From this inequality it follows that in the long-term equilibrium there are
always some borrowers of Type B who are left out of the market in equilibrium. (The
inequality  p < 1/(1+r) is equivalent to rk < n-k and [rk] £ rk.) In other words, the
long-term equilibrium always involves credit rationing. Of course, loans made to
those Type B borrowers who do enter the market are going to wind up in default, and
the Credit Agency takes this into account. Calculating the ratio of loans made to Type
B’s to the total of loans granted, we find the equilibrium default rate to be given by
the quantity r/(1+r).13
6. Concluding Remark
In discussions concerning the nature of rationality, it is usually held that maximizing
behavior is bound to win out over non-maximizing behavior in the evolutionary
struggle. What this essay shows is that if short-term equilibrium is required in every
period along the dynamic evolutionary path, then this widely believed assertion may
fail, even when reputation and other long-term concerns play no role. The nature of
the short-term equilibria may be such as to protect the non-maximizers from eventual
extinction and even to allow them to prosper in the long term. The relevance of this
conclusion may lie well beyond our analysis of a simple-minded credit market.
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